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Abstract
The paper starts from a proposition of institutional design for climate
policies made previously by David Bradford and labelled GPGP (Global
Public good Purchase). The scheme is compared with other possible post-
Kyoto schemes that are, or not, ”Kyoto compatible”. The comparison puts
the emphasis on the participation issue, (free riding, ratchet eect), and on
the desirable ﬂexibility of the schemes’ targets. It argues that the incidence
of climate policies on the ﬁnal price of fossil fuels is a key and di!cult issue
which has not received, untill now, the amount of required attention.
JEL : D02, D6, D7, F18, Q4,Q5
Institutional design, fossil fuels prices, ratchet eect, quantity versus
prices, tax incidence
Résumé:
Ce texte part de l’examen d’une proposition d’une architecture de poli-
tique climatique due à D. Bradford et désignée sous le sigle GPGP (Global
Public Good Purchase). On la compare à d’autres architectures post-Kyoto
envisageables, plus ou moins ”Kyoto-compatible”. La comparaison met
l’accent sur la participation (resquille, eet de cliquet), mais aussi sur la
ﬂexibilité souhaitable des cibles visées. L’eet indirect des politiques clima-
tiques sur le prix ﬁnal des carburants fossiles est une question essentielle et
di!cile qui ne semble pas avoir reçu l’attention qu’elle mérite.
JEL : D02, D6, D7, F18, Q4,Q5
Institutions, carburants fossiles, eet de cliquet, quantité contre prix,
incidence ﬁscale.
1
I thank H. Tulkens for his constructive advice, O. Compte for useful criticisms
on a previous version. I am particularly grateful to L. Karp and C. Philibert for
their detailed comments and suggestions. I am only responsible for remaining
imperfections..]Introduction1.
Climate policies raise a number of questions which have two sides. One side
concerns the desirable pace of action, the other one calls for reflection on the
means of action. Although they are not fully “independant”, these two types of
issues can be partly assessed from separate reasonings.
The first problem, the desirable pace of action, raises interesting questions,
both analytically and conceptually. For example, the reflection on long run dis-
count rates is intimately related with the assessment of the nature and extent of the
uncertainty associated with the greenhouse question (see for example Guesnerie
(2004)). This was the subject I had initially chosen to treat for this conference.
A second set of issues is associated with the analysis of the means of action
and especially with the design of international action. This is a subject on which
David Bradford has made striking propositions advocated in his paper “Improv-
ing on Kyoto: greenhouse gas Control as the Purchase of a Global Public Good”
(from now GPGP)2. David had initially accepted to present these propositions at
this conference. After his tragic death, the conference has been made a memorial
conference in his honour. Henry Tulkens agreed with my suggestion of redefin-
ing the topics of the present lecture : it was then aimed at complementing the
presentation of the paper initially proposed by David and which was read at the
opening session of the conference. The lecture was hence originally conceived as
an extended comment of David’s propositions,
Taking note of this agenda, it should be clear, however, that the assesment of
GPGP cannot be made in the vacum. In particular, it calls for comparison of the
proposed scheme with the competing arrangements of the Kyoto protocol. And
1This is the revised version of the keynote lecture: ”Institutional design : some analytical
problems in the comparison of Post-Kyoto schemes with emphasis on GPGP” presented to the
conference ”the design of climate policies” held in Venice on 22-23 July 2005. The background
ot the lecture and the choice of its topics are explained in the introduction.
I thank H. Tulkens for his constructive advice, O. Compte for useful criticisms on a previous
version. I am particularly grateful to L. Karp and C. Philibert for their detailed comments and
suggestions. I am only responsible for remaining imperfections.
2Indeed, the proposition has been circulated under two diﬀerent headings, “No Cap But
Trade”, (NBCT), or “Global Public Good Purchase” (GPGP). Here we will stick to the second
teminology.
such a comparison suggests to put emphasis not on the strict version of the Kyoto
protocol, but for reasons that will be explained later, on a variant of Kyoto, called
Open Flexible Kyoto. Hence the paper puts comments on GPGP in the broader
perspective of the comparison of GPGP with what I call ”Kyoto-compatible”
schemes. The comparison does not claim to be exhaustive but puts emphasis
on two important dimensions of the design of climate schemes : the first one is
participation and the second one is the nature of climate policy targets. Finally,
enlarging the scope of the comparison of climate policies, the paper brings back a
former ”tax harmonisation” proposition into the picture.
The plan of the paper reflects the option taken and just explained.
- The first section proposes a brief reminder of GPGP (2-1), and then provides
a first comparison of arrangements along the lines of the GPGP proposition , and
of Kyoto-like arrangements, (the so-called Open, Flexible Kyoto, OFK). In this
section, the comparison focuses mainly on the participation issue and successively
envisages:
- The short run ”participation” issue (2-2-1) which deals with the
static ”free riding” problem.
- The ”ratchet eﬀect” issue, which may be viewed as relating to so-
phisticated or dynamic “free riding”. (2-2-2)
Section 2-3) summarizes the findings and then turns out making suggestions
for improvement, that are particularly directed at GPGP.
- The second section turns the attention to the desirable flexibility of climate
policy targets. Section 3-1-1) comes back on the conventional wisdom bearing on
the comparison of ”prices versus quantity”, which suggests that Kyoto arrange-
ments are too rigid. On these grounds, GPGP is shown to be more satisfactory.
Section 3-1-2), however, questions the conventional wisdom from a discussion of
the incidence of policies on the price of fossil fuels. Section 3-2) extends the scope
of the comparison between schemes and examines how to reassess the discussion
on the relative merits of ”tax harmonisation” and of various ”Kyoto-compatible”
schemes.
Appendices 1-9 provide detailed analytical arguments.
1. Comparing GPGP and Kyoto like arrangements.
1.1. GPGP, a brief reminder.
For the purpose of the analysis here, GPGP, which is presented in Chapter 1 of
this book, is articulated as follows (Bradford (2001) :
• ”Voluntary”countries provide initial contributions. For the purpose of the
analysis, here, the set of contributing countries, their characteristics as well
as the amount of their contributions, will usually be exogenously given.
• A Business As Usual level (from now BAU) of emissions allowances is at-
tributed to all countries (allowances are ”generous” for non contributing
countries)
• An agency acquires emissions allowances i.e it buys reductions levels from
the BAU level from all countries in the world, at a market price : this agency
is called International Bank for Emission Allowances Acquisition. (IBEA)3
GPGP is usefully illustrated in a stylised , static and certain, world. It is as-
sumed that there is only one-period, one single greenhouse gas and that abatment
costs are certain. Formally:
Countries are indexed by i∈ I.
The costs of qi units of emissions abatment, measured from a Business As
Usual (BAU) basis are given by a convex cost function Ci, defined for every qi.
The utility generated in country i, from total reductions Q, is Ui(Q), i.e
Ui(Q−i+qi), withQ−i =
P
j 6=i qj.The function Ui is usually assumed to be concave.
3Incidentally GPGP proposes an original system of control, which avoids measuring emissions.
The Kyoto protocol relies on a measurement of emissions of participating countries. GPGP
proposes a system that looks simpler : measuring imports of carbon in fossil fuels. Imports
may be “extraction” from the ground within the borders or shipments across the border from
another country (exports being treated from the viewpoint of the country as a negative import,
cancelling the corresponding production).. Naturally, there is some discrepancy between the
measured quantity and carbon emissions, but the measurement looks very simple. Accuracy of
the measurement of emissions looks more of a problem. See for example, Hargrave, T., (1998),
McKibbin, W. J. & P. J. Wilcoxen, (2000)This (interesting) aspect of the proposal is only
recalled here for memory and is not discussed further. For the sake of the comparison attempted
here, import allowances are not distinguished from emissions allowances.
There are two groups of countries. They are called respectively (and metaphor-
ically4) Annex B, (i ∈ B),where dUi/dQ > 0,in the whole range under considera-
tion and non Annex B countries (i ∈ NB) that are supposed to be unconcerned5
by the policy, i.e to be associated with dUi/dQ = 0,∀Q, (Ui = Cste(= 0)).
Let us now consider a GPGP equilibrium, associated with exogenously fixed
contributions Ti.i ∈ B
Definition 1. AGPGP equilibrium, associated with fixed contributions Ti, i ∈ B,
consists of abatments (q∗i ≥ qi, i ∈ B, q∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ NB), a positive ”carbon price”
t∗, such that :
















The GPGP equilibrium is said to be individually rational iif
4. :{Ui(Q∗)+t∗(q∗i −qi)−Ci(q∗i )−T i} > Ui(
P




i , i ∈
B,and where qi is an a priori given reference level.
The interpretation is simple and reflects, in the given context, the above un-
formal presentation of the scheme :
B-countries contribute the - exogenously - fixed amount Ti; t∗ is the carbon
price paid by the central agency; the BAU levels of abatments are qi, in B-countries
and zero in NB countries; abatments of country i ∈ B equal (Max(0, q∗i − qi) or
equal q∗i , i ∈ NB,so that the sum of payments, associated with abatments beyond




Conditions 1 and 2 define the optimal decision respectively of B and NB coun-
tries.
The viability condition, equivalently an individual rationality condition, ex-
presses the fact that a B-country is better oﬀ than in an (the) initial reference
4Metaphorically, because the terminology suggests that the GPGP contributing countries
would be the Annex B countries of the Kyoto protocol.
5This is a too extreme assumption but a reasonable modelling option to separate B and non
B countries.
situation. This condition is necessarity satisfied for a NB-country, but not nec-
essarily for a B-country if its initial contribution (or its6 qi) Ti is too high. Here
as in the Appendix, we assume that the reference situation is an anterior non
cooperative Nash equilibrium of abatments7. In the remaining, we always assume
that qi = qi8.
Our evaluation of GPGP and its comparison with Kyoto like arrangements
will first consider the so called free riding issue.
1.2. Participation.
1.2.1. ”Standard” free riding.
There have been many reflections on the stability of climate policy arrangements
and this conference has a number of contributions on this subject.
Indeed, the Kyoto arrangements are most vulnerable to some form of ”free
riding”. A cooperative policy can be expected to be stable only in a weak sense:
Carraro (1999) reviews existing results and a number of papers in this conference
are concerned with this issue (in particular H. Tulkens’one)9.
One main argument for GPGP is that it solves, or at least powerfully helps
solving, one problem coming under the heading of ”free riding”, i.e the participa-
tion problem. If the BAU cap is computed correctly, then it is in the unambigu-
ous interest of a NB-country to participate in the abatment process : it cannot
lose but, by selling allowances, only win. As we assume in the definition that
the arrangement is viable for B-countries (this is the viability constraint 4), all
countries are willing to participate. Clearly, this is true in our stylised model, but
would remain true, in an uncertain world, only if the cap were made contingent on
6We note that any change in qi can be matched by a change of Ti, that leaves the equilib-
rium unchanged. Viewing formally the contribution as a money contribution plus an abatment
contribution, allows, without loss of generality, to take the quota associated with a B-country,
qi,to be 0.Naturally, the cost function would have to be redefined accordingly.
7Indeed, the fact that the BAU levels are taken to be zero for NB countries and non zero
for B countries, is supposed to reflect the fact that in the anterior Nash equilibrium, (defined in
Appendix 2) B countries would abate when NB would not.
8Which, from the two previous footnotes, might be taken equal to zero, a convention which
would however aﬀect the interpretation of Ci and in particular of Ci(0).
9Very briefly, one may note that there are some forces for cohesion in the sense that ”free
riding”, for most formal definitions of the word, is unlikely to be a “dominant strategy” for any
actor, but these cohesion eﬀects are limited in the sense that defecting from the arrangement,
at least if one assumes that the others will stay, is most often an optimal strategy.
enough verifiable events. Hence, as David Bradford suggested, the computation of
contingent BAU levels should be enough accurate and if not, enough “generous”.
Hence, although contribution to the the financing is optional and made on
voluntary basis, the design would trigger self advantageous participation of all
nations in the abatment scheme.
This is apparently a decisive advantage: a scheme that leaves out of the
arrangement a significant part of the world suﬀers from serious drawbacks. The
most significant one is visualised (and possibly caricatured) from the curve below
(Figure 1): on the horizontal axis is the eﬀort of the climate coalition (measured
for example by the carbon price), on the vertical axis is the reduction of the world
emissions.
Figure 1
Figure 1 depicts a humped shaped curve: at a low level of eﬀort of the coalition,
the emissions decrease when the eﬀort increases, but the amount of reductions may
go to a maximum. The reason is that polluting industries of the coalition lose
market shares and/or migrate outside and this happens more and more whenever
the eﬀort level of the coalition increases. Indeed, under some assumptions on the
“out of the coalition” standards, reductions might further decrease with the eﬀort
level, associating possibly a higher eﬀort level with lower performance. A still
sketchy but more formal presentation of the argument is provided in Appendix 1.
It puts emphasis on the elasticity of substitution beteween ”de-carbonated” and
”carbonated” goods. Although, given present estimates, the phenomenon seems
unlikely in the aggregate, unless the climate coalition level of eﬀort becomes very
high, a bold empirical assessment of the parameters of the formal analysis would
suggest that the phenomenon (”carbon leakage” over 100 per cent) is plausible at
the industry level : increasing the eﬀort in virtuous countries might increase the
world emissions within a given industry, when the coalition level of eﬀort becomes
significant (for an empirical assessment , see Demailly-Quirion in this volume).
One will scrutinize below the nature of the advantage of GPGP scheme over
Kyoto like schemes, (from now K). To do that, it is useful to define a Flexible
Kyoto arrangement, (flexible meaning that quotas are tradable on an international
market for permits, as they are in the actual treaty).
Definition 2. a Flexible Kyoto equilibrium consists of (exogenously given) quotasbqi, i ∈ B,abatments (q∗0i ), i ∈ B, a positive ”carbon price” t∗, such that :







i∈B bqi = Q∗0
It is individually viable if
3. {Ui(Q∗0)) + t∗(q∗0i − bqi)− Ci(q∗0i )} > Ui(Pi qi)− Ci(qi).
In a flexible Kyoto equilibrium, the sum of abatments equals the sum of ini-
tially attributed quotas, (NB-countries are not concerned), and is taken as given
in the individual optimisation that takes into account the cost and the market
price of abatments (1). But quotas are traded, and the equilibrium price of the
market for permits is t∗.Note that in the definition, quotas are fixed, even if they
may have been ex-ante bargained in order to vary the burden across participating
nations10.
But, naturally such an FK scheme does not solve the participation problem
of Developing Countries (this is clearly true in our stylised model, where NB-
countries are not participating)11. Given the failure of FK to trigger participation
of a part of the world in which emissions are likely to become significant, the
scheme is then likely to be potentially much less eﬀective than a GPGP scheme :
this participation argument is clearly at the heart of D. Bradford’s proposition
However, I would like to suggest that it seems fair to compare GPGP not
necessarily with the actual Kyoto arrangement, but with variants of Kyoto that
would mimick the GPGP solution to the so-called participation problem.
To this aim, one variant of Kyoto, denoted (OFK), Open Flexible Kyoto, is
now proposed : those countries which are non contributing in the GPGP scheme
would be given, within the FOK scheme, the same BAU targets they have in
GPGP and would be induced to participate in a rather similar way. Indeed, such
targets, called nonbinding targets, (or in a slightly diﬀerent way ”no-lose” or
10Contrarily to ”real” Kyoto arrangements, where the quotas are fixed in reference with the
countries’levels of emissions at a given year (1990), with little possibility of bargaining, (but on
the reference year itself) around this reference arrangement.
It seems however that increasing the number of degrees of freedom in the arrangement, by
playing in a more flexible way on the repartition of national quotas might favour stability in
some sense, although it might make the negotiations trickier. As an illustration of this idea, the
ex-post favourable treatment of Russia, turned out to be conducive to (incomplete)stability of
the Kyoto arrangements. However this was obtained by ”luck” rather than by the design of the
negociations design.
11In the real world, NB-countries are induced to participate via the CDM mechanisms : this
seems however to provide only limited incentives.
”one way” targets) have been proposed as a way to induce participation of the
Developing Countries in the Kyoto scheme (in particular by Philibert (2000) or
Philibert and Pershing (2001)).
Here is a formal definition of OFK :
Definition 3. an Open Flexible Kyoto equilibrium consists of (exogenous) quotasbqi, i ∈ B,abatments (q∗∗i ), i ∈ I, a positive ”carbon price” t∗∗, such that :
1. q∗∗i is a solution of Max {t∗∗(qi − bqi)− Ci(qi)}, i ∈ B,
















4. It is individually viable if ∀i ∈ B : {Ui(Q∗∗) + t∗∗(q∗∗i − bqi) − Ci(q∗∗i )} >
Ui(
P





In an Open Flexible Equilibrium, the environnemental performance is still
given by the quotas of the Annex B countries, but non Annex B countries, which
are given non binding commitments, participate, and, as in a GPGP scheme,
benefit from participation, while decreasing the cost of Annex B countries.
Appendix 2 repeats the formal definitions of the just evoked schemes GPGP,
OFK, while introducing some others (Nash Equilibrium) needed for a compre-
hensive analysis, always within the stylized framework of a simple world without
uncertainty. It is shown that the definitions are not empty (in particular, for fixed
contributions, there exists a unique GPGP equilibrium, which is convenient for
the analysis, although not obvious).
The analysis suggests (proposition 6) that, if one forgets the viability con-
straints (4), the abatment targets attainable through GPGP schemes, when the
contributions are varied, are identical to the abatment targets attainable in an
OFK scheme, when the quotas are varied12.
The analysis also suggests, although it is not always true, that the contributing
countries, let us call them annex B countries, using the Kyoto vocabulary, are
likely to be better oﬀ in a GPGP scheme when compared with an OFK scheme
that leads to the same ecological performance. Hence participation constraints for
B-countries are more likely to be satisfied with GPGP.
12This may justify to view GPGP, as in Guesnerie (2003) , as “Kyoto-compatible” !
This may look surprising13. The reason is that in a GPGP scheme annexB
countries, when faced with some given carbon price, tend to have a more ambitious
abatment policy than when they face the same carbon price in an OFK scheme;
taking that into account, they may pay a cheaper bill in order to attract non
Annex B countries (Corollary7).
Note that the so suggested superiority of GPGP for ensuring participation
is probably weak : I conjecture that it decreases when the size of Annex B in-
creases. Also, the property does not necessarily imply that coalitional stability, in
a more demanding sense, would be more likely with GPGP, i.e that the negotia-
tion between Annex B countries would be easier under GPGP. We have nothing
to say here on the more general issue that comes under the heading of ”coalitional
stability”.
Note also, as argued by David Bradford, that one advantage of GPGP, for
real world negotiations, is transparency of the costs, when transparency of the
costs of OFK is only guaranteed in a world without uncertainty14. Hence, actual
diﬀerences in stability of arrangements between GPGP and OFK may reflect real
eﬀects, as the ones just stressed in a certainty context, but also those due to
uncertainty, notwithstanding possible “framing” eﬀects (the fact that two equiv-
alent games are played diﬀerently according to a priori insignificant diﬀerences of
formulation).
At this stage, the advantage of GPGP over the actual Kyoto (K) arrange-
ments, in terms of participation, is clear. But it is not decisive, in the sense that
variants of Kyoto may mimick one central feature of GPGP : voluntary costly
participation could be in principle triggered, as well as voluntary non costly par-
ticipation, by adopting an Open Flexible Kyoto (OFK). And, as just argued, and
from the analysis presented in the Appendix, the comparison between GPGP and
OFK, while suggesting an advantage for GPGP, remains at this stage somewhat
unconclusive.
1.2.2. The ratchet eﬀect.
One should however stress that participation decision of the countries that are
supposed to join is less obvious than suggested by the previous analysis, a fact
of which D.Bradford was fully aware of. Indeed, the previous argument and the
13Particularly, in view of the fact that the latter might induce Pareto optimality when the
former cannot.
14For OFK, without uncertainty, the outcome is in principle ”transparent”.
stylised one made in David Bradford’s paper take place in a static world. In a
dynamic world, the fixation of initial BAU quotas will be followed, next period,
by the fixation of next BAU quotas. The scheme will face what is known to be
a “ratchet eﬀect”. The ratchet eﬀect has plagued the performance of the Soviet
economy, where firms were reluctant to seize present bonuses under the expecta-
tion that current quotas would be raised to-morrow as a consequence. Asymmetric
information between the Center and the firms, and absence of commitment from
the Center, lie at the heart of the ratchet eﬀect, and optimal bonuses may be de-
signed, taking into account the asymmetry of information and non-commitment.
(see Freixas-Guesnerie-Tirole (1985)).
In the GPGP scheme, the ratchet eﬀect takes a simple form : a country, when
considering selling its allowances, should take into account not only the benefits
from its present sale, but also, possibly the loss due to the eﬀect of its decision
on its next amount of BAU allowances. It is easy to imagine circumstances where
the participation decision, particularly of non contributing countries, (non annex
B, in our terminology) would be postponed. Even if it were not the case, the
actual incentives to reduce emissions would be lower than the apparent monetary
incentives (x dollars per ton of carbon on the market for allowances).
Hence, the main virtue of GPGP i.e that it solves the Developing Countries
participation problem, is less convincing than it looks. Naturally, the same re-
marks apply to the related devices that would sustain an OFK scheme (non bind-
ing constraints, one—sided constraints)15.
The remedy to the ratchet eﬀect, whether we are in an OFK scheme, or a
GPGP scheme has a name: (long term) commitment. Strict commitment would
mean that the BAU allowances of GPGP are fixed at the outset for a very long
period of time. But the number of contingencies to be taken into account in the
determination of allowances would become unrealistically high. An (partial) alter-
native would be to agree on long run targets, which then would likely be somewhat
uniform between countries, (and then might refer to per capita emissions, may be
corrected by some production indices and some climate damages exposure). This
would not suppress opportunistic considerations in the abatment decisions but
would limit their scope.
Again, one may think that the ratchet eﬀect plagues, in somewhat similar ways,
GPGP and Kyoto schemes. Solutions are similar under both types of arrange-
15Also, in the present Kyoto protocol, the ratchet eﬀect is likely to appear at the renegotiation
stage, in spite of some existing dispositions that penalize non attainment of the objectives.
Countries that have performed poorly are likely to take this as a case for lower future objectives.
ments but presently are of dubious feasibility.
1.3. Suggestions for improvement and first conclusions.
Let us sum up. David Bradford proposition’s revives an old procedure for financing
public goods, voluntary contribution; it does that while showing that countries
that are not willing to finance the scheme might be given allowances that induce
them to participate in the implementation of the climate policy. We have just
argued that the scheme favours participation, in a way that makes it superior
to the present Kyoto arrangements, but in a way that might be mimicked by
variants of the Kyoto scheme. However, both an improved Kyoto scheme and
GPGP scheme are likely to be plagued by ratchet-like eﬀects.
Taxation is another way, which historically has been most successful to finance
public. Let us suggest that in a GPGP framework, the financing rules might be
changed to rely (partly) on an emission tax, paid at each period by every country
and based on the amount of its previous period emissions. In principle, the taxation
scheme would remain combined with a voluntary contribution, (the a priori weight
given to the taxation component of the resources of the agency should be thought
carefully). Hence, every country, would have (part of) its contribution, at least in
future periods, determined by a tax on its emissions of the previous period.
One will object that taxation is associated with the “regalian” power of a
Government and there is no such thing as a world Government, to-day and in a
predictable future. However, in this variant of the scheme, voluntary participation
might still be triggered, probably at levels of total contributions similar to those of
the initial GPGP scheme.
The idea is simple and may be more conveniently illustrated, by introducing
formally a GPGPPT scheme (Global Public Good Purchase Plus Taxation).
Definition 4. A GPGPPT equilibrium, associated with ’exogenous) contribu-
tions Ti.i ∈ B, consists of abatments (q∗i ≥ qi, i ∈ B, q∗i > 0, i ∈ NB), a positive
”carbon price” t∗, such that :






2. q∗i is a solution of Max {t∗qi − Ci(qi)}, i ∈ NB.
3. Ti = tE−1i + ei,wheret is a tax rate and E
−1











It is straightforward to check that in the short run, (see Appendix 4) the initial
voluntary contributors in the GPGPPT scheme may be given the same burden
than in the original GPGP scheme.
Going further, making this tax non linear would make sense. In particular,
introducing an exemption level would be in line with leaving Developing Countries
temporarily out of the business of financing and indeed would be part of the
rationale for the separation between B and Non B countries.
Let us stress two virtues of the mix of voluntary contribution and taxation
involved int the suggested amendment.
First, in such a modified GPGP framework, the tax would both contribute
to provide the financing means and would have a ”leverage eﬀect” on incentives:
assume that, in a steady state, the price of carbon on the market managed by the
IBEA agency is y dollars per ton and the (marginally flat) tax on carbon emissions
is x dollars per ton, then, forgetting about discounting, the incentives to reduce
emissions of one unit in the present period is x+y, (instead of y).
Second, and consequently, the system would hence be likely to considerably
limit the ratchet eﬀect. This would be the case, in particular, of countries that
currently do not contribute and are not taxed, since they would have to consider
how the present eﬀort contributes to determine some future taxation burden.
The curious reader will note that the somewhat hidden hypothesis that explains
the argued increase in performance of the new scheme is not that it involves
some ”quantity commitment” on the future, but that it sustains some kind of a
”procedure commitment” i.e the fact that the taxation of past emissions will be
on the negociation table at the next stage of the game.
Whether this is a politically realistic post-Kyoto scheme remains unsure. It
seems however to provide an arrangement possibly superior to the initial GPGP
and to OFK (although OFK might be amended with a tax arrangement analogous
to the one suggested here and serving to finance a minimum carbon price..).
Introducing taxation suggests to extend the discussion on possible climate
policies schemes, and to compare either the initial GPGP scheme, or its (hopefully)
improved variant just suggested (Global Public Good Purchase Plus Taxation,
GPGPPT), or OFKwith another possible scheme, that was suggested16 at an early
stage of the climate negotiations, and that was labeled “harmonized taxation”.
Harmonised taxation is often viewed as a prototype ’price” policy, opposed to the
Kyoto-like ”quantity” policy. We will recall this distinction in the next section,
while assessing the intermediate status of GPGP. As a prerequisite to the general
discussion, we shall ask whether we should stick , in the comparison of prices
versus quantity policy, to the conventional wisdom.
2. Flexible or rigid targets : GPGP, Kyoto-like schemes and
Tax harmonisation.
2.1. Prices versus quantities:
2.1.1. the standard viewpoint.
The Kyoto protocol implements a quantity policy, in the sense that it sets
global objectives in terms of emissions for the participating partners. National per-
formances may diﬀer from national quotas, since these quotas can be exchanged
on an international market that allows partners to sell or to buy emissions al-
lowances. But the total authorized amount of emissions is left unchanged. This
basic option of the Kyoto protocol has been criticized on the grounds that it is
not enough flexible, given the present uncertainty on the costs of abatment. It
leads to too little reduction, if it turns out that the (marginal) cost of abatment is
smaller than expected; it leads to too much reduction in the contrary case. Hence,
the performance of a quantity policy is suboptimal in the presence of uncertainty.
A price mechanism, (implicitly associated with a uniform tax on carbon emis-
sions) also leads to a suboptimal performance, although in a diﬀerent way: it
introduces a discrepancy with the optimal eﬀort that increases with the slope of
the marginal benefit curve . The comparison between the two policies, price and
quantity, which are in general both non-optimal, is usually made along the lines
of argument just briefly suggested and initially stressed by Weitzman (1974).
The transposition of the argument to the greenhouse problem requires
making assumptions on the shape of the marginal benefit curve: it is in general
assumed to be flat on the grounds that the amount of reductions under consider-
ation is small compared to the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Under
16It was the suggested by the Europeans and rejected by the US. Positions have now switched
to some extent..
this assumption, a price policy would be superior to a quantity policy. The argu-
ment of the superiority of the so-called ”price policy” over the ”quantity policy”,
in a climate context, has been revisisted and confirmed in a dynamic framework
both analytically sophisticated and with operationally plausible calibrations (see
the work of Newell-Pizer (2000) and Pizer(2001)). A number of objections to the
approach (and hence to the conclusion) have been made (see Karp-Hoel (2001),
(2002), Karp-Zhang(2005), Victor(2001)). They will not be discussed here where
emphasis will be put later on diﬀerent objections. At this stage, one may note
here that the so-called price policy, the superiority of which is claimed, should aim
not only at partial tax harmonisation, (a - small - additional carbon tax equal for
all countries). Rather, it should likely lead to significant tax harmonisation, (a
significant carbon tax that would wipe out the present huge diﬀerences in total
carbon taxation between countries). One may wonder whether it should not pos-
sibly aim at a more ambitious goal, something like stabilising the total price of
carbon (which reflects not only the carbon tax but also the price of the carbon
implicit to the price of the fossil fuel where it comes from). We shall come back
on that later.
Here, let us only note that along the lines of the standard price quantity ar-
gument, a GPGP performs better than a K scheme. The reason, developed in
Appendix 6, is that in the price-quantity space, the outcome of a GPGP scheme
obtains from the intersection of an hyperbola (corresponding to a fixed expendi-
ture — product of price by quantity - ) and of the marginal cost curve. It then
allows less quantity abatment fluctuations than would be optimal but more fluc-
tuations than triggered by a pure quantity policy, (with comparable expected
expenditures).
2.1.2. Prices versus quantities : should we stick to the conventional
wisdom ?
One will sketch here a critical review of the standard assessment, (conventional
wisdom) which is, on several points, tentative but which puts the comparison of
quantity policies (Kyoto), price policy (tax and price harmonisation) and mixed
price-quantity policies (GPGP) in a better perspective.
- First, there are technical objections to the leading defence of the standard
argument, which do not seem to have been stressed the earlier literature and in
the previously quoted papers. One of them relates with time-aggregation and
the separability of costs: a sequential model in which the marginal cost curve in
each period is increasing says that the first action at time t+1 is (much) less costly
than the last action at time t and that these costs are independant.This modelling
artefact may bias the argument against quantity policies.
- Second, the analysis of the outcome of a pure taxation policy, without
quantity constraints, should take into account the reactions of the prices of fossil
fuels to the taxation scheme. The issue is delicate, for several reasons, among
which one may single out two. First, the short run and the long run incidence
eﬀects have to be disentangled, second, the pricing of fossil fuels has oligopolistic
dimensions that make it actually more diﬃcult to assess than in the reference
competitive model.
Let us recall the basic insight of the static, competitive model of the exploita-
tion of an exhaustible resource : there, a tax has no eﬀect on the total price and
only transfers the rent from the producers to the taxing authority. This key static
insight has dynamic counterparts. Tax increases trigger oﬀsetting movements of
producers prices (although only very special time patterns of tax changes will leave
final prices and quantities unchanged); taxes also help here transferring the rent
from the owners of the exhaustible resource to the consuming countries; finally,
it is only an appropriate modulation of taxes through time that allows to delay
the exhaustion time of the resource. (See Appendix 8). Although there has been
in the past a significant amount of work on the price of fossil fuels (see the sur-
vey of Karp-Newbery(1993)), the climate policy dimension of the problem does
not seem to have attracted much specific work. An exception is Chakrovorty-
Magné-Moreaux (2003), Magné-Moreaux (2002)): although these papers take
into account neither uncertainty nor oligopolistic pricing, they convey messages
that seem most relevant for the design discussion and hence deserve more scrutiny.
2.2. Tax harmonisation versus Kyoto-compatible schemes.
Harmonised taxation has been suggested as a superior arrangement when com-
pared to Kyoto-like schemes. We will sketch a reassesment of the issue while
including GPGP and OFK into the picture.
• What is meant by tax harmonisation?: Section 3-1-1 distinguishes par-
tial tax harmonisation, (an additional carbon tax equal for all countries),
full tax harmonisation, (a carbon tax roughly uniform when the present sit-
uation involves huge diﬀerences between countries), or, may be, a stabilized
and planned total price of carbon17.
17Which, again, is the sum of the carbon tax plus the price of the carbon implicit to the price
The formal definition of an harmonized tax equilibrium, in the simple frame-
work considered in Appendix 2, assures that the carbon price can be con-
trolled, and would be generally associated with full tax harmonisation, al-
though one will challenge this interpretation later.
Definition 5. An harmonised Tax equilibrium consists of abatments (q00i ), i ∈ I,
a positive ”carbon tax” or ”carbon price” t00, such that :








00), where Ri(t) is the solution of Max {tqi−Ci(qi)}
3. The welfare of country i is {Ui(Q00)− Ci(Ri(t00))}
• The definition calls for several comments.
a. Tax harmonisation does not leave any degree of freedom in the repar-
tition of burdens ( as analysed in D. Bradford’s (2002) appendix). Its outcome
can be mimicked, again in the simple world of Appendix 2 considered here, by a
Kyoto-like arrangement where quotas are such that there is no trade on the world
permit market (see Appendix 7).
b. Placing severe limits on the income transfers that are possible may
be viewed as an advantage when income transfers from developed countries to
developing countries are viewed with suspicion18. There is an actual additional
advantage: since there is no strict connection between present and future targets,
an harmonised taxation scheme is in principle less vulnerable to the form of the
ratchet eﬀect described above.
c. The impossibility of transfers seems however to have serious inconve-
niences : income transfers give more flexibility in the search of a stable (ambi-
tious) arrangement; in particular, as it is the case in our simple model, unanimous
voluntary participation is likely to be trigerred only at lower levels of eﬀort.
• The complex relationship between prices of fossil fuels and taxes, suggest
that full tax harmonisation strictly speaking would leave rather uncertain
the final price of fossil fuels. Hence, the above model would really describe a
of the fossil fuel where it comes from.
18Such a suspicion seemed to be implicit to the US position in the negotiations of the Kyoto
protocol.
carbon price control policy and not an harmonised taxation situation19. In
fact, the quantity performance associated with the harmonised taxation pol-
icy may be grossly suboptimal, when compared to the carbon price control
policy imbedded in the above definition.
There are multiple reasons for such a suboptimal performance. They may
be analysed in a simplistic world of a single exhaustible resource with com-
petitive owners with perfect foresight. First, prices responses may partly
oﬀset the eﬀect of taxes. Second, one may be skeptical vis à vis the long
run outcome of tax harmonisation (or even pure price policies), that are not
committed at the outset : the time profile of taxes should be announced in a
credible way at the outset, unless the final price reaction will be diﬃcult to
assess. Third, the quantity reactions of providers of the exhaustible resources
is plagued by ”eductive instability”20 etc. And the real world uncertainty of
the outcome is probably greater than what the simplistic analysis alluded
to before suggests.
• Appendix 9 shows, graphically, why, when the above considerations are
taken into account, the ranking of a pure Kyoto quantity policy, of a GPGP
arrangement or a tax harmonisation with uncertain eﬀects, is ambiguous,
even when the marginal benefit curve is flat.
On the whole, the reassessment of the price versus quantity debate, only at-
tempted here, gives more credence to a pure quantity policies associated with
Kyoto schemes and introduces another and yet unexplored dimension of compari-
son between GPGP and OFK, a dimension which may weaken the case for GPGP
. Further and new reflection on the eﬀects of carbon tax schemes on fossil fuels
pricing should be most welcomed..
3. Conclusion
This paper has compared GPGP and Kyoto like schemes.
It has been argued that the advantage of GPGP, as a powerful device for
triggering universal participation, can be mimicked by a variant of Kyoto, called
19The interpretation of our model of GPGP is subject to a similar objection, althufh the OFK
modelling is not.
20For an ”eductive” viewpoint on the conditions of expectational coordination, see Guesnerie
(2005). The fact that price coordination is in this context strongly ”eductively unstable”, is
straigthforward in the simplest models suggested above.
OFK. The comparison between OFK and GPGP is partly unconclusive, although
the latter has three strong points. First, it seems (slightly) superior for triggering
participation; second it can be modified to include some kind of emissions taxation
in a way that would attenuate the ratchet eﬀect; third it determines more flexible
targets than Kyoto schemes and is hence less exposed to the standard criticism
made to quantity policy.
However, it has been argued in the last Section, that the conventional wisdom
on the relative virtues of price versus quantity has to be re-examined in depth, in
order to take into account the reaction of the price of fossil fuels to carbon taxes.
When this dimension is taken into account, the merits of harmonized taxation
will have to be reassessed downwards, and the evaluation of GPGP and OFK, in
terms of target flexibility, may be significantly aﬀected, reopening the debate on
their the relative merits.
4. Appendix1: Eﬀort level in Annex B and global reduc-
tions.
Let assume that the eﬀort level in Annex B countries is measured by the ”normal-
ized” price of carbon, denoted t, so that the price of the carbon intensive good is
p + t, the level of reductions per unit of the carbon intensive good is (∂C)−1(t),
so that the level of reductions is D(.)(∂C)−1(t),where D(.) is the demand for the
good.
In non annex B countries, the price is p, but no reduction action is imple-
mented, and there is at the outset an excess emission of u per unit of production.
Calling respectively D(B, ., .) and D(NB, ., .) the demand functions for the
goods produced in the two areas, the total level of reductions, as a function of
t, is :∆(t) = I[D(B, p, p) − D(B, p + t, p)] + (∂C)−1(t)D(B, p + t, p) − (I + u −
)[D(NB, p+ t, p))−D(NB, p, p)]
where I is the initial carbon content of B-goods and where  may (here ex-
ogenously) take into account the fact that the new demand in Annex B countries
is met between firms using the old nonAnnex B technology and migrating firm
using the initial Annex B technology.
One has (d∆/dt) = −∂1D(B, ., .){I−(∂C)−1(t)}+((∂C 0)−1(t))D(B, ., .)−(I+
u− )[∂1D(NB, ., .)]
The shape of ∆(t) depends on the form of the demand function, but is as
suggested in the text under a number of circumstances. For example, with CES
demand functions, when the elasticity of sustitution between the de-carbonated
good and the carbonated good is greater than one, the eﬀect of an increase in the
carbon tax in the B-countries on total emissions becomes ambiguous : the two
first (positive) terms may become dominated by the last term (which is negative).
Note however than the required elasticity of substitution is more plausible at the
industry level (steel, for example), than at the aggregate level. It is left to the
reader to illustrate the phenomenon from his own crude empirical estimates at
the industry level, (steel..).
5. Appendix 2 : Comparing GPGP and OFK
Countries are indexed by i∈ I.
The cost of reductions of emissions of amount qi, measured from a Business
As Usual (BAU) basis are associated with a convex cost function Ci, defined for
every qi.
The utility generated in country i, from total reductions Q, is Ui(Q), i.e
Ui(Q−i + qi), with Q−i =
P
j 6=i qj.The function U is concave.
There are two groups of countries, let us say Annex B, (i ∈ B),where dUi/dQ >
0,in the whole range under consideration and non Annex B countries (i ∈ NB)
that are supposed to be associated with dUi/dQ = 0, ∀Q i.e Ui = Cste(= 0),i.e to
be unconcerned21 by the policy.
We will define formally :
Definition 6. A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, as a set of abatment levels qi
s.t :
qi is a solution of the problem : Max {Ui(
P
j 6=i qj + qi) −Ci(qi)}.
Note that in a Nash equilibrium :
qi > 0, i ∈ B, qi = 0, ∀i ∈ NB
Note also that existence of a Nash equilibrium, follows from very weak as-
sumptions22. The uniqueness problem is apparently more complex : however, as
it is formally analogous to the problem of existence in a Cournot oligopoly when
firms have a concave maximand, we can import classical results from oligopoly
theory :
21This is a too extreme assumption but a reasonable modelling option to separate B and non
B countries.
22For example from the strict concavity of cost or the boundedness of the utility function.
Proposition 7. • When all B-countries are similar,there exists an equilib-
rium .
• If the utility function is concave, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. (Sketch) For part a) it is enough to note the formal similarity of our
problem and of a Cournot problem. Check that, as in a Cournot problem
discontinuities of best reply are upwards, and transpose the proof of Bamon-
Fraysse(1985) or Novshek (1985).
For part b), it is enough to check the continuity of best reply functions and
to show that the Selten trick applies. As the Selten trick will be explained
later, we advise the reader to check our suggestion after further reading.
Now we might assume, with the slight loss of generality suggested above, that
the equilibrium is unique and without loss of generality that qi = 0,∀i. (This
implies however to redefine Ci(qi), i ∈ B, )
Let us now consider a GPGP equilibrium, associated with fixed contributions
Ti.i ∈ B (i.e we assume that B-countries contribute the - now exogenously - fixed
amount Ti)
Definition 8. AGPGP equilibrium, associated with fixed contributions Ti, i ∈ B,
consists of abatments (q∗i ≥ qi, i ∈ B, q∗i > 0, i ∈ NB), a positive ”carbon price”
t∗, such that :
















The GPGB equilibrium is said to be individually rational iif
4. :{Ui(Q∗)+t∗(q∗i −qi)−Ci(q∗i )−T i} > Ui(
P




i , i ∈
B
The definition is commented in Section 2-2-1.
The existence problem is again not straigthforward. We shall prove :
Proposition 9. If the utility function is concave, there exists for fixed normalized
Ti, a unique GPGP equilibrium.
Proof. The proof has several steps.
1- We first define a pseudo t-GPGP equilibrium, the fixed ”carbon price t
being positive, as consisting of abatments (q
◦
i > 0, i ∈ B ∪NB), , such that :
a) q
◦







i is a solution of Max {tqi − Ci(qi)}, i ∈ NB.
We call ri(Q−i, t) the best reply function, in problem a) (clearly continuous in
Q−i and t) and write (Selten’s trick) : fi(Q, t) = ri(Q − fi(Q, t), t) : fi(Q, t)) is
the pseudo best reply of i to the total level of public good Q, for fixed t.
For i∈ NB,we have the best reply Ri(t), independant of Q−i.
2- We then prove the existence and uniqueness of a pseudo t-GPGP equilib-
rium.







We then show that dfi/dQ =
dri/dQ−i
1+dri/dQ−i
and from the inspection and diﬀer-
entiation of the first order conditions of problem a) (left to the reader) that the
denominator is positive and the numerator negative. The left-hand side of the
equilibrium equation is at fixed t, decreasing in Q.
Equilibrium and uniqueness follows.
3- We now prove, as the left-hand side is increasing in t, (and equal zero (Nash)
when t = 0, that Q0(t) is increasing in t.
It follows that tQ0(t) is increasing in t, starting from zero and going to infinity.
It necessarily reaches
P
Ti, at some and unique t∗. QED.
A corollary obtains :





Definition 11. a Flexible Kyoto equilibrium consists of (exogenously given) quo-
tas bqi, i ∈ B,abatments (q∗0i ), i ∈ B, a positive ”carbon price” t∗, such that :







i∈B bqi = Q∗0
It is individually viable if
3. {Ui(Q∗0)) + t∗(q∗0i − bqi)− Ci(q∗0i )} > Ui(Pi qi)− Ci(qi).
In a flexible Kyoto equilibrium, the sum of abatments equals the sum of initial
quotas, (NB-countries are not concerned), and is taken as given in the individual
optimisation that takes into account the cost and the market price of abatments
(1). But quotas are traded. Here, the equilibrium is unique (the demand for abat-
ment is an increasing function of t.) and Pareto superior23 to a ”rigid” Kyoto
equilibrium, without trade of the quotas, and hence individually viable if the
former is.
Note that the real Kyoto arrangement is formally a Flexible Kyoto arrange-
ment in which the quotas are fixed from the consideration of a basis year
Now
Definition 12. an Open Flexible Kyoto equilibrium consists of (exogenous) quo-
tas bqi, i ∈ B,abatments (q∗∗i ), i ∈ I, a positive ”carbon price” t∗∗, such that :
1. q∗∗i is a solution of Max {t∗∗(qi − bqi)− Ci(qi)}, i ∈ B,
















4. It is individually viable if ∀i ∈ B : {Ui(Q∗∗) + t∗∗(q∗∗i − bqi) − Ci(q∗∗i )} >
Ui(
P





In an Open Flexible Equilibrium, the environnemental performance is still
given by the quotas of the Annex B countries, but non Annex B, which are
given non binding commitments participate, and benefit from participation while
decreasing the cost of Annex B countries. It is left to the reader to show that a OFK
equilibrium exists is unique and involves a Pareto-improvmeent when compared
with the FK equillibrium with the same bqi.
Our next ” theorem” stresses less obvious comparative features :
1. Proposition 13. 1. Proposition 14. Given an Open Flexible Kyoto Equi-
librium, there exists a family of GPGP, all with the same total contri-
bution
P
Fi of Annex B countries, inducing the same total abatment.
In the change, the welfare level of non-Annex B countries is lower, when
the change of welfare of Annex B countries is ambiguous. However, it
is positive under the conditions set in Corollary 7, so that particpation
constraints are met in GPGP if they are in an OFK.
23This is straigthforward.
2. Given a GPGP equilibrium, there exists a family of OFK equilibria,
each of one having the same level of total abatment. In the change the
welfare level of non-Annex B countries is higher.
Proof.
• Part 1)Take an OFK equilibrium, t∗∗, q∗∗i .
























with a∗i = (∂Ui/∂Q)(Q∗)
It is straightforward that Q∗ >cQ.
Hence, from the previous corollary, there exists a t0 GPGP equilibrium, t0 < t∗∗,




0 + ai) +
P
i∈NB Ri(t
0) =cQ, with ai = (∂Ui/∂Q)( bQ)
The diﬀerence of welfare of one AnnexB country, measured in ”money”, is :
t0Ri(t0 + ai)− t∗∗(Ri(t∗∗)− bqi)− Ci(Ri(t0 + ai)) + Ci(Ri(t∗∗).
i.e this country would be equally well oﬀ, if it were subject to a positive Ti
transfer such that :
t0Ri(t0 + ai)− t∗∗(Ri(t∗∗)− bqi)− Ci(Ri(t0 + ai) + Ci(Ri(t∗∗)) = Ti














The question is whether the transfers can finance the abatment payment,
whose need is :P
i∈B t












∗∗)− Ci(Ri(t0 + ai))





0 + ai))− (Ci(Ri(t∗∗))
there exists a GPGP equilibrium where Annex B countries are better oﬀ.
The right hand side equals :P
i∈NB(t
∗∗ − t0)Ri(t∗∗) + t0(Ri(t∗∗)−Ri(t0))
The left-hand side is smaller than :P
i∈B(t
0 + ai)[Ri(t0 + ai))−Ri(t∗∗)]






i.e , taking into account the fact that the total abatment is the same in both
situations :P
i∈NB(t




Although in general this inequality may not be satisfied, it is plausible that it
is.
• Part 2)
Let a GPGP equilibrium associated with t∗.



















Conclusion follows easily. QED
The question of the diﬀerence of welfare for Annex B countries for GPGP and
OFK equilibria with the same level of abatment can easily be settled in some
special cases. The next statement is quoted as a corollary, since it follows easily
from an inequality derived in the previous proof.
Corollary 15. If all m+n countries have a similar quadratic cost function Ci(q) =
q2, if all m AnnexB countries have similar preferences,
Then in the above proposition part 1, all Annex B countries are better oﬀ, as
soon as the carbon price in the initial OFK equilibrium is not smaller than the
marginal willingness to pay of a single Annex B country..
Proof. In the above case, the above OFK and GPGP equilibria are such that
:
(m+ n)(t∗∗) = m[t0 + a] + n[t0]
It follows that : (t∗∗ − t0) = [m/(m+ n)]a
The inequality :P
i∈NB(t







∗∗ − t0)t∗∗ +
P
i∈B(t
∗∗ − t0)a > ma2
[mn/(m+ n)]at∗∗ + [m2/(m+ n)]a2 > ma2
Which holds true when t∗∗ > a.
QED.
6. Appendix 3 : GPGP, between a "price" and a "quantity"
policy.
Where does stand GPGP in the standard price versus quantity debate ?
Here is a diagrammatic sketch, figure 2, of the formal argument, that refers to
the standard Weitzman’ framework :
On the horizontal axis is the abatment quantity, on the horizontal axis is a
cost or benefit measure. I assume that, conformably to the conventional view of
the greenhouse eﬀect, the benefit curve is almost horizontal. Cost is unknown and
there are a priori two diﬀerent marginal cost curves.
Figure 2.
The shaded area visualizes the welfare loss due to an (optimal) quantity policy,
assuming that the price policy is exactly optimal, i.e the benefit curve is exactly
horizontal.
GPGP makes the spending constant and the abatments obtained as suggested
on the diagram for an (approximately) optimal GPGP.
GPGP appears then as intermediate between the price policy and the quantity
policy.
7. Appendix 4 : GPGPPT and "Tax harmonisation"
We provide here in the simple model of appendix 2, a definition of GPGP Plus
Taxation equilibrium and of an harmonised tax equilibrium.
Definition 16. A GPGPPT equilibrium, associated contributions Ti.i ∈ B, con-
sists of abatments (q∗i ≥ qi, i ∈ B, q∗i > 0, i ∈ NB), a positive ”carbon price” t∗,
such that :






2. q∗i is a solution of Max {t∗qi − Ci(qi)}, i ∈ NB.
3. Ti = tE−1i + ei,wheret is a tax rate and E
−1











It is easy to check that choosing t =Min(Ti/E−1i ),allows to adjust the GPGP
contributions to any a priori given profile of contributions.
Definition 17. An harmonised Tax equilibrium consists of abatments (q00i ), i ∈ I,
a positive "carbon tax" t00, such that :









3. The welfare of country i is {Ui(Q00)− Ci(Ri(t00))}
The reader will note that a tax equilibrium is an OFK with bqi = Ri(t00)
8. Appendix 5 : Tax incidence for an exhaustible resource.
We refer to the model sketched in the text : pure competition, perfecf foresight,
constant discount rate, time invariant demand function, and diﬀerent assumptions
on the boundary behaviour of prices
• Case 1 :
The resource is exhausted at time T, before it gets a substitute :
The producer price is denoted p, the total price is denoted P, the diﬀerence is
the tax τ .
Necessarily : p(t) = p(0) exp(rt), P (t) = p(t) + τ(t).
An increase of a tax, from τ(t), to τ 0(t) = τ(t) + , t ≤ t ≤ t + , (τ(t) =
τ 0(t) elsewhere) reduces the producer price from p(0) exp(rt) to p0(0) exp(rt) s.t :
TZ
0
D(p0(0) exp(rt) + τ 0(t))dt =
TZ
0
D(p(0) exp(rt) + τ(t))dt.
A temporary increase in the tax depress the producer price all over the period
and depress the total price all over the period, but at the time the tax is increased.
• Case 2 :
There is a (perfect) substitute at time T 0, of price v. After time T, the final
price of the resource is v, and the demand is shared between the resource
and its substitute in the proportion α and 1−α. The resource is exhausted
at time T.
Necessarily : p(t) = p(0) exp(rt), P (t) = p(t) + τ(t), P (t) = v, t ≥ T 0.
A temporary increase of a tax, from τ(t), to τ 0(t) = τ(t)+, t ≤ t≤ t+ < T 0,
reduces the producer price from p(0) exp(rt) to p0(0) exp(rt) and increase the
exhaustion time to T s.t :
T 0Z
0










9. Appendix 6 : Uncertainty on tax incidence : an example
where a quantity policy is better than a price policy
Here, figure 3, the price policy consists of an harmonised tax. However the eﬀect of
the harmonised tax on the carbon price is uncertain in the medium run, reflecting
:
- the uncertainty on the future tax,
- the absence of commitment,
- the diﬃculty of predicting the medium run reaction of producers price and
the diﬃculties of expectational coordination (”eductive instability”).
Then for a given tax decision, there are two possible values of carbon prices,
one over the marginal benefit and the other one below. In the same framework as
appendix 3, figure 3 visualises a case where the pure quantity policy (Kyoto like)






Aldy, J.E., P. R. Orszag & J. E. Stiglitz, ”(2001) ”Climate Change: An Agenda
for Global Collective Action”, Prepared for the conference on “The Timing of
Climate Change Policies”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, October
Barrett, S., (2001), ”Towards a Better Climate Treaty”, Policy Matters 01-29,
Brookings Institution, November
Bamon R. and Fraysse J (1985) ”Existence of Cournot Equilibrium in large
Markets”, Econometrica, 53, (3), 587-597.
Bradford, D.F. (2001), ”Improving on Kyoto: A No Cap but Trade Approach
to Greenhouse Gas control”, Princeton University, in this volume, Chapter 1..
Chakrovorty U, Magné B., Moreaux M, (2003) « Energy resource substitu-
tion and carbon concentration targets with non stationary needs”, Leerna 31,
Université Toulouse 1.
Cooper, R., (1998), ”Toward a real global warming treaty”, Foreign Aﬀairs,
vol. 77 n◦2, March/April
Carraro C.(1999) ”The Structure of International Agreements on Climate
Figure 3:
Change”in C. Carraro C. (ed), International Environmental Agreements on Cli-
mate Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, NL
Chandler H. Tulkens () International Journal of Game Theory
Freixas X, Guesnerie R, et Tirole J. (1985) « Planning under incomplete in-
formation and the ratchet eﬀect », Review of Economic Studies, LII, 173-191..
Guesnerie R. (2003) “Les enjeux économiques de l’eﬀet de serre” in « Kyoto
et l’économie de l’eﬀet de serre”, sous la direction de R. Guesnerie, La Documen-
tation Française, Paris.
Guesnerie R ( 2004) « Calcul économique et Développement durable », Revue
Economique, p.363-382.
Guesnerie R. (2005) ”Assessing Rational Expectations :2- ”Eductive” stability
in economics, MIT Press, 453p.
Ha-Duong M, Grubb M et. Hourcade J.C, (1997) ”Influence of socio—economic
inertia and uncertainty on optimal CO2-emissions abatment”, Nature, Vol. 390.
Hargrave, T., (1998), ”US carbon emissions trading: description of an up-
stream approach”, Centre for Clean Air Policy, Washington D.C., July
Hoel, Michael, and Larry S. Karp.(2001). “Taxes and Quotas for a Stock
Pollutant with Multiplicative Uncertainty.” Journal of Public Economics, Vol.
82, pp. 91-114
Hoel, Michael, and Larry S. Karp. (2002)“Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock
Pollutant.”Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 367-384 .
Karp, Larry S., and Jiangfeng Zhang. (2005)“Regulation of Stock Externalities
withCorrelated Abatement Costs.” Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol.
32
No. 2 pp 273 -300.
Karp, Larry S., and David M. Newbery.(1993) “Intertemporal Consistency
Issues in Depletable Resources.” In Handbook of Natural Resources, Vol. III,
edited by
Allen Kneese and James Sweeny. North Holland, New York, , pp. 881-930.
McKibbin, W. J. & P. J. Wilcoxen, (2000), ”Designing a Realistic Climate
Change Policy that includes Developing Countries”, Paper for the 2000 Conference
of Economists, the Gold Coast, July 3-5
Magné B., Moreaux M. (2002) “Long run energy trajectories : assessing the
nuclear option in response to global warming”, Leerna DP 0226101, Université
Toulouse 1.
Neary P (1999) ”International trade and the environnement : theoretical and
policy linkages”, mimeo;
Newell, R.G. & W.A. Pizer, (2000), ”Regulating Stock Externalities Under
Uncertainty”, Discussion Paper 99-10, Resources for the Future, Washington DC,
February.
Nordhaus, W.D, (2002), ”After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control
Global Warming”, Paper prepared for the meetings of the American Economic
Association and the Association of.IEA/SLT(2002)28
Novshek W. (1985) ”On the existence of Cournot equilibrium”, Review of
Economic Studies 52, 85-88.
Philibert, C. (2000). “How could emissions trading benefit developing coun-
tries.” Energy Policy , volume 28, n◦13.
Philibert, C., and J. Pershing. (2001). “Des objectifs climatiques pour tous
les pays : les options.” Revue de l’énergie 524.
Pizer, W.A., (2001), ”Combining Price and Quantity Control to Mitigate
Global Climate Change”, Journal of Public Economics, 85,(3), 409-434.
Victor, D., 2001, ”The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to
Slow Global Warming”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Rieu J.(2002) ”Politiques nationales de lutte contre le changement climatique
et réglementation de la concurrence : le cas de la fiscalité”, mimeo.
Tulkens H. (2005) « Stability issues and climate related dynamic externalities
», this conference.
Weitzman, M. L., (1974), ”Prices vs. Quantities”, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, vol.41, October.
